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Across space and time, various socioeconomic systems have existed and still 
exist, each with its own features and characteristics that distinguishes it from 
other socioeconomic systems. For example, the form of capitalism in the mod-
ern Western world is a socioeconomic system distinct from, and presumably 
much more complex than, the socioeconomic system that shaped tribal life. 
One could also claim that the socioeconomic system in place in the Scandina-
vian countries nowadays is a different system than, or at least differs in some 
significant respects from, the socioeconomic system in current-day United 
States. Acknowledging this fact raises the following question: is it possible to 
analyse, explain, and predict phenomena in those different socioeconomic 
systems by using the same theories and models, or is it necessary to develop 
different theories and models that each apply to different socioeconomic 
systems? This is the problem of historical specificity. As Hodgson puts it in 
How Economics Forgot History (2001), this problem of historical specificity 
“addresses the limits of explanatory unification in social science: substantially 
different socioeconomic phenomena may require theories that are in some 
respects different” (p. 23). Note the ‘in some respects’, for it is likely that 
different socioeconomic systems still have a number of phenomena in com-
mon. Scarcity of resources, to take an example from Hodgson (2001), seems 
to be a characteristic that many, if not all, socioeconomic systems share.1  The 
fundamental idea behind historical specificity is that despite those possible 
commonalities, socioeconomic systems may differ sufficiently to warrant 
theories and models that are tailored to the socioeconomic system at hand 
(Hodgson, 2001). Such theories tailored to a specific socioeconomic system 
or systems are labelled historically sensitive theories; phenomena that are rela-
tive to socioeconomic systems are labelled historically sensitive phenomena.
This essay intends to contribute to the discussion on whether eco-
nomic theories and models should be historically sensitive and how such 
a historically sensitive science of economics may be developed. More 
precisely, it aims to argue in favour of historically sensitive theories by 
appealing to the notion of invariance introduced by Woodward (2005). 
Invariance applies to causal generalizations, and can intuitively be under-
stood as a measure of the extent to which a causal generalization continues 
to hold under changes in the (putative) cause. For the problem of histori-
cal specificity, the most important feature of the notion of invariance is 
that it is relative to systems. That is, a generalization may be invariant 
(may hold) in one system, but not in another system. Woodward (2005) 
argues that theories of causal explanation should require generalizations 
to be invariant, instead of requiring generalizations to meet the criteria 
of lawhood. Lawhood refers to the idea that generalizations qualify as law 
only if they meet certain criteria such as exceptionlessness and universal 
validity. Based on this, the main claim made in this essay is that adopting 
the notion of invariance instead of the notion of lawhood provides one 
with a conceptual-causal framework that naturally incorporates historical 
specificity, or at least a framework that can deal properly with historical 
specificity. If Woodward (2005) correctly claims that invariance should 
replace the notion of lawhood, it follows that historical specificity—or at 
least relativity to a system or systems—is a natural feature of any causal 
generalization. In addition to the main claim, this essay shows that even 
though the problem of historical specificity is nowadays largely forgotten 
about and even considered obsolete (or so Hodgson (2001) argues), the 
idea of historically sensitive theories is consistent with some methodologi-
cal statements of two prominent economists—Milton Friedman and Fritz 
Machlup. The point of showing this is not to give an additional argument 
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in favour of incorporating historical specificity in economics, but to sug-
gest a strategic way to convince economists of the relevance of this notion.
This essay is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide some histori-
cal context surrounding the notion of historical specificity. Subsequently, I 
describe the notion of invariance in section 3. Section 4 studies the relation 
between historical specificity and invariance and argues that the notion of 
invariance naturally incorporates the notion of historical specificity. It also 
shows that the ideas of historical specificity and invariance are reconcilable 
with the methodological positions (or at least with some methodologi-
cal statements) of Milton Friedman and Fritz Machlup. The last section 
concludes.
2. Historical specificity: origins and development2 
Why is the problem of historical specificity important? If socioeconomic 
phenomena are historically sensitive, the importance is evident. For, 
supposing that socioeconomic phenomena are indeed historically sensi-
tive, how could economists explain historically sensitive socioeconomic 
phenomena in different socioeconomic systems using the same theo-
ries and models? To the extent that those phenomena are relative to the 
system(s) in which they occur, this would indeed be impossible. Granted, 
an economist who is not aware of the supposed historical sensitivity of 
socioeconomic phenomena may develop a theory that works well in the 
context of modern-day capitalism, and he or she may never think about 
verifying the predictions of the theory or using the theory in the context 
of different socioeconomic systems. In such cases, not taking into account 
historical specificity seems to be not much of a problem—until a change 
in the socioeconomic system occurs, which in turn would result in an 
economist perplexed with the apparent lack of applicability of the hitherto 
well-working theory. Hence, though in the shorter run an economist may 
develop fruitful theories without being concerned about historical specific-
ity, in the long run it will turn out—still supposing that socioeconomic 
phenomena are indeed historically sensitive—that the theory only applies 
to a specific socioeconomic system or some socioeconomic systems, and 
the necessity of historically sensitive theories will unfold.
The importance of the problem of historical specificity was widely rec-
ognized throughout the history of the discipline of economics. Specifically, 
Karl Marx and his followers, the German historical school, and the insti-
tutionalists attached significant importance to this problem and devoted 
considerable attention to it. However, inter alia due to the rise of Nazism 
and the subsequent World War II, which diminished the influence of the 
German historical school, interest in the problem of historical specificity 
withered despite it not being resolved yet. Economic principles became 
widely considered as universal principles, not attached to particular times 
or places. The purpose of this section is to present some historical context 
surrounding the notion of historical specificity—its origins, development, 
and the reasons for the contemporary lack of interest in this problem.
It should first be noted that around the beginning of the 1800s, the 
prevailing conception of history changed from the idea that there is some 
kind of ‘natural order’ around which history oscillates to the idea that his-
tory is a developmental process (Hodgson, 2001, 43-55). Hodgson (2001) 
listed some starting shots that were already given in the centuy before, such 
as the publication of books by Giambattista Vico (1725), Charles Baron 
de Montesquieu (1748), Adam Smith (1776), and William Robertson 
(1777), amongst others. Hegel’s ideas about history as a developmental 
process, together with several revolutions in Europe overthrowing existing 
orders and aiming at progress, further supported ideas about the necessity 
to devote attention to particular historical circumstances.
This is where Marx enters the stage (Hodgson, 2001, 43-55). Influ-
enced by Hegel’s ideas about the dialectical course of history, Marx criticized 
‘bourgeois economists’—in particular Pierre-Joseph Proudhon—in a letter 
to Pavel Annenkov (28 December 1846) for regarding “economic catego-
ries as eternal laws and not as historical laws which are laws only for a given 
historical development” (quoted in Hodgson, 2001, p. 45). Accordingly, 
Marx’ Das Kapital (1867) is about the capitalist mode of production, that 
is, a historically situated socioeconomic system characterised by particular 
relations between workers and owners of the means of production and par-
ticular laws determining the evolution of that socioeconomic system. In 
his Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (1859), Marx also presents a theory 
of socioeconomic change and outlines an approach for distinguishing dif-
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ferent socioeconomic systems, both based on conflicts between ‘material 
productive forces’ and ‘relations of production’.
Sometime before Marx, the older German historical school already 
argued that economic theories should be historically sensitive (Hodgson, 
2001, 56-64). One important figure is Wilhelm Roscher, who published 
his Grundriss in 1843, a widely read book in which he spells out the so-
called ‘historical method’ of research. Another important publication is 
Friedrich List’s Das Nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie, where he 
shows how national economic development depends on particular histori-
cal features of a national economy. For example, List argues that though 
the economic principles developed by the classical economists may apply to 
developed nations such as the British, they did not apply to less developed 
nations such as Germany.
The ideas of the historical school did not remain confined to Germany. 
Most notably, in the British Isles historicist ideas were taken over by Richard 
Jones, John K. Ingram, and Cliffe Leslie, amongst others (Hodgson, 2001, 
65-74). An event that played an important role in promoting historicist 
ideas was the Irish potato famine. The adopted laissez-faire approach to 
solving this famine turned out to exacerbate the effects of the famine (or so 
the historicists argued), thereby demonstrating that supposedly universal 
economic principles were in fact not universal after all. A success for the 
British historical school that should be noted is the acknowledgement of 
the problem of historical specificity by both John Stuart Mill and Walter 
Bagehot.
The younger historical school in Germany agreed with its predeces-
sor—the older historical school—that theories and models in economics 
should be historically sensitive (Hodgson, 2001, 113-134). A notable figure 
of the younger historical school is Max Weber, who proposed a conceptual 
framework of ‘ideal types’. Ideal types are agents in models that serve a 
theoretical and heuristic function, as means to understand more complex 
phenomena. Within this framework, Weber leaves room for analysis of gen-
eral aspects of economic phenomena as a preliminary task. Such general 
analysis subsequently needs to be supplemented by more historical types of 
analysis in order to answer the questions that economists are interested in.
Unsurprisingly, not every figure or school in the history of economic 
thought agreed that economic theory should be historically sensitive. In 
1883, Carl Menger published his Untersuchungen that turned out to be 
the kick-off of the Methodenstreit (Hodgson, 2001, 79-94).3  In this book, 
Menger attacked the methodology of the historical school on four themes, 
amongst which the problem of historical specificity. Menger concluded that 
the science of economics should be based on universal principles, not on 
historically sensitive principles that may differ per socioeconomic system. 
This conclusion was based on the argument that individual action shapes 
all economic activity, supplemented with the argument that the individual 
self-interest motive (on which, Menger argued, economic analysis should 
focus) forms part of “the most original and the most general forces and 
impulses of human nature” (Menger, 1985, p. 86). Two other figures in the 
history of economic thought that merit mention here are John Maynard 
Keynes and Lionel Robbins (Hodgson, 2001). Both contributed to the 
neglect of the problem of historical specificity in the post-war period by 
engaging in general theorising without regard for historical circumstances. 
Lionel Robbins, for instance, defined economics as the science of indi-
vidual choice under scarcity. Given that individual choice and scarcity are 
phenomena that all socioeconomic systems have in common, Robbins’ 
definition made way for analysing socioeconomic phenomena in different 
socioeconomic systems by analysing the universal problem of individual 
choice under scarcity. John Maynard Keynes disregarded historical sensi-
tivity by assuming that economic analysis is ultimately based on universal 
psychological laws.
Despite the importance attached to the problem of historical specificity 
in the history of economic thought, and despite the developments towards 
properly dealing with this problem, attention for and interest in historical 
specificity nowadays is close to non-existent. Conventional wisdom has it 
that the historical school simply lost the Methodenstreit. However, Hodgson 
(2001, 21-40) argues that this is not the case: though the historical school 
may have lost the debate on induction versus deduction, the debate on 
historical specificity was certainly not won by the opponents of histori-
cally sensitive theorising. More plausible reasons for the lack of attention 
for the problem of historical specificity that Hodgson (2001) lists are the 
inadequate methodological frameworks of the historical school, the mis-
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conception that arguing in favour of historical specificity is tantamount to 
arguing against theory, the methodological transformation of economics 
and sociology in the 1930s, and the rise of Nazism and the subsequent 
World War II. With regard to the inadequate methodological framework, 
for the older historical school the main point of inadequacy concerned 
their naïve empiricism. However, the baby was thrown out with the bath-
water: not only naïve empiricism was rejected, but many methodological 
tenets of the historical school, including the problem of historical speci-
ficity, were rejected as well. The younger historical school avoided naïve 
empiricist positions, but lacked time to develop an adequate alternative 
due to the rise of Nazism and the Second World War. The unfortunate 
misconception that being in favour of incorporating historical specific-
ity in economic theory implies that one must be against theory seems to 
stem from the naïve empiricist tendencies of the older historical school. 
That this need not be the case becomes clear from the positions taken by 
the younger historical school. Lastly, the methodological transformation 
in economics initiated by Lionel Robbins (1932) was partially an attempt 
to bury the problem of historical specificity. Combined with the defeat of 
institutionalism in the United States in the 1940s and the breakdown of 
German academia in the Second World War, this made room for (certain 
kinds of ) theories that ignored the problem of historical specificity.
 
3. Invariance4 
In this section I concisely introduce Woodward’s overall project, describe 
the notions of interventions and invariance, and present Woodward’s argu-
ments for his claim that the notion of invariance should replace the notion 
of lawhood in theories of causal explanation.
3.1 Woodward’s Manipulability Theory of Causation
Woodward introduces the notion of invariance in his book Making Things 
Happen (2005) as a part of his overall project in which he develops a 
manipulability theory of causality and a corresponding theory of causal 
explanation. Before describing the notion of invariance in this essay, it is 
necessary to spend some words on Woodward’s overall project. Woodward 
bases his theory on patterns of counterfactual dependence, specifically 
“pattern[s] of counterfactual dependence of the special sort associated with 
relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation 
and control” (Woodward, 2005, p. 13). An example is perhaps the most 
convenient way to sketch Woodward’s theory.
One example that Woodward uses throughout his Making Things 
Happen concerns the relation between atmospheric pressure, a barometer 
reading, and the occurrence of a storm. Consider the generalisation ‘If the 
barometer reading were to fall, a storm would occur’ (G-1 for short). This 
generalisation highlights a pattern of counterfactual dependence between 
barometer readings and the occurrence of storms. However, given that we 
cannot manipulate or control the occurrence of storms by manipulating 
or controlling the barometer readings, this counterfactual relation between 
barometer readings and the occurrence of storms does not count as a causal 
relationship, and one cannot refer to (G-1) to causally explain the occur-
rence of storms. In contrast, take the generalization ‘If the atmospheric 
pressure were to decrease, a storm would occur’ (G-2). This generalization 
also highlights a pattern of counterfactual dependence; moreover, given 
that it is conceptually possible to manipulate or control the occurrence of 
storms by manipulating or controlling the degree of atmospheric pressure, 
this generalization counts as causal and can be used to causally explain the 
occurrence of storms. 
Woodward’s approach to causation is not entirely new. Manipulationist 
theories of causation have been developed by philosophers such as Gasking 
(1955), Collingwood (1940), von Wright (1971) and Menzies and Price 
(1993), though Woodward’s theory differs from those in various respects. 
Non-philosophers have also endorsed a manipulationist approach of 
causation, most notably Cook and Campbell (1979) and Pearl (2000). 
Woodward emphasizes his indebtedness to Pearl (2000) for the formal 
framework that he uses to develop his manipulationist theory of causation. 
Despite Woodward’s approach not being entirely original, his Making 
Things Happen became a very influential treatment of causation.
3.2 Interventions and Invariance
Woodward employs two notions that are important in enabling one to 
distinguish between causal and non-causal generalizations: interventions 
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and invariance. The notion of an intervention (Woodward, 2005, 95-151) 
describes how a putative cause should be manipulated in order to be able 
to verify whether or not changes in the putative effect occur. Intuitively, 
one can think of an intervention as an idealized experimental manipula-
tion. Woodward describes the idea behind the notion of an intervention as 
follows: “An intervention on some variable X with respect to some second 
variable Y [where X and Y represent a putative cause and effect, respec-
tively] is a causal process that changes the value of X in an appropriately 
exogenous way, so that if a change in the value of Y occurs, it only occurs 
in virtue of the change in the value of X and not through some other causal 
route” (Woodward, 2005, p. 94).5 Note that the notion of an intervention 
is thus relative to the generalization under consideration; specifically, it 
is relative to the putative cause X and putative effect Y. It is possible that 
some causal process counts as an intervention on X with respect to Y, but 
not as an intervention on X with respect to Z.
Using this notion of an intervention, Woodward introduces the notion 
of invariance: “A generalization G … is invariant if G would continue to 
hold under some intervention that changes the value of X in such a way 
that, according to G, the value of Y would change— "continue to hold” 
in the sense that G correctly describes how the value of Y would change 
under this intervention” (2005, p. 15). Invariance, Woodward (2005, 
239-245) claims, is a key feature that causal generalizations and causal 
explanations possess. For example, when applied to (G-1) we see that this 
generalization is not invariant: if we intervene on the barometer reading 
so that the reading would fall, a storm would nevertheless not occur as a 
result of this intervention. (G-1) thus fails to hold under interventions, 
and is therefore not invariant. Because it is not invariant, it does not count 
as a causal generalization or explanation. In contrast, the generalization 
(G-2) is invariant: if we would intervene on the atmospheric pressure so 
that atmospheric pressure would decrease, a storm would occur. Because 
(G-2) is invariant under interventions, it counts as a causal generalization 
or explanation.
Some more words on invariance. The most important feature of the 
notion of invariance for the problem of historical specificity is that invari-
ance is relative to a system (Woodward, 2005, 245-254). Returning to the 
example of the ideal gas law, whereas this law has a considerable range of 
invariance under interventions when applied to a system of gases, the gen-
eralization is non-invariant under interventions when applied to a system 
of liquids. Hence, a generalization can be invariant in one system, but 
non-invariant in another system. Note that a system of gas may consist of 
the same elements as a system of liquids. For instance, both a gas and a 
liquid may consist of H2O. It is thus not necessarily the case that different 
systems behave differently because they consist of different elements; the 
same elements may behave differently in different systems.
Woodward’s focus is on invariance under interventions with regard 
to change-relating generalizations (2005, 245-254). The notion of invari-
ance can legitimately be applied to non-change-relating generalizations 
(e.g. generalizations of the form ‘All mammals have elastin in their arter-
ies’6) or to invariance under changes in background conditions or changes 
in the values of variables that do not count as interventions. However, 
those forms of invariance are irrelevant for distinguishing between causal 
and non-causal generalizations, hence the focus on change-relating gen-
eralizations7. The question then arises when a generalization is a valid 
change-relating generalization. This is in fact a question of causal relata: 
what factors can be taken to be putative causes or effects? For Woodward, 
the relevant criterion here is whether there is a well-defined notion of 
changing the value of a given variable; in other words, we must be able 
to say what it is like to change or manipulate a variable. To take another 
example from Woodward, in an experiment testing the efficacy of some 
new drug, there is a well-defined notion of changing the value of the vari-
able ‘Subject received treatment’ from 0 to 1 (i.e. from ‘False’ to ‘True’) 
by administering the drug. In contrast, suppose we have a variable that 
can take on the values ‘Lizard’, ‘Kitten’, and ‘Raven’. In this case, we do 
not have a well-defined notion of what it is like to change a lizard into a 
kitten, or a raven into a lizard, for example. Hence, such variables cannot 
figure in causal generalizations because such generalizations would not be 
change-relating generalizations.
Another important feature of Woodward’s concept of invariance 
is that it comes in degrees (2005, 257-265). Unlike traditional crite-
ria for lawhood figuring in other accounts of explanation such as the 
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Deductive-Nomological model, a generalization is not either invariant 
or non-invariant. Instead, a generalization can be more or less invariant 
depending on two factors: first, the range of interventions under which 
the generalization is invariant, and second, the importance of the interven-
tions under which it is invariant. Which interventions count as important 
depend on the subject matter or the domain. The interventions deemed 
important in microeconomics, for example, are likely to differ from the 
interventions deemed important in physics. A postulated microeconomic 
relationship, for instance, may lack invariance under surgical interven-
tions on the brain structure of some individual, but the lack of invariance 
under such circumstances is rightly of not much concern to economists. 
In contrast, invariance under changes in the information available to an 
individual is important, given that information plays a key role in micro-
economic theory. With regard to the range of interventions, Woodward 
uses the example of the ideal gas law and van der Waals force law. The 
first law postulates certain generalisations about the behaviour of some 
ideal hypothetical gas that approximates the behaviour of real gasses 
relatively accurately. The law breaks down, however, in circumstances in 
which intermolecular forces are important (e.g. at sufficiently high tem-
peratures). Van der Waals force law, on the other hand, also continues to 
hold under interventions associated with circumstances in which intermo-
lecular forces are important. Hence, van der Waals force law has a greater 
range of invariance than the ideal gas law. Returning for a moment to the 
system-relativity of invariance discussed above, that invariance comes in 
degrees implies that generalizations may have different degrees of invari-
ance in different systems. The system-relative feature of invariance is thus 
no dichotomous feature.
3.3 Invariance as a Better Alternative for Lawhood
In his discussion of the notion of invariance, Woodward (2005, 239-314) 
often contrasts this notion with the notion of lawhood. Woodward argues 
that the standard way of thinking about universal laws is inadequate to 
base a theory of explanation on, for the reason that many generalizations 
do not fit neatly into the dichotomous classification of generalizations as 
either universal laws or purely accidental generalizations. According to 
Woodward (2005), in order to classify as a law, a generalization has to 
meet at least many of the traditional criteria for lawhood including excep-
tionlessness, absence of references to particular objects or spatiotemporal 
locations, projectability or confirmability by the instances of a generaliza-
tion, support for counterfactuals, a wide scope, potentially integrable into a 
body of systematic theory, and the criterion that the generalization should 
play a unifying or systematizing role in research. A paradigmatic example 
of a law would be the field equations of General Relativity. A generaliza-
tion such as ‘Smoking causes cancer’ would not qualify as a law. A problem 
that Woodward identifies here is that many generalizations that we do not 
regard as purely accidental nevertheless fail to qualify as a law. This does 
not only apply to generalizations in the social sciences such as economics 
or sociology, but also to generalizations in physics and chemistry (think 
for example of the ideal gas law discussed above and the generalization 
about smoking causing cancer). This seems to be an important limita-
tion of theories of explanation based on lawhood: many generalizations 
accepted by scientists as valid would classify as purely accidental gener-
alizations and would hence, according to such theories, not be suitable 
to figure in explanations. The response to this limitation in the form of 
relaxing the criteria for lawhood runs into another problem, namely that 
the distinction between paradigmatic laws of nature such as the field equa-
tions of General Relativity and generalizations that are emphatically not 
paradigmatic laws of nature such as the ideal gas law disappears.
The fundamental problem, then, seems to be the dichotomous clas-
sification of generalizations as either universal laws or purely accidental 
generalizations. The notion of invariance, Woodward contends, is much 
better suited as a basis for causal explanation, partially because it allows for 
classification in degrees instead of dichotomous classification. Moreover, 
Woodward argues that ideas similar to his notion of invariance are already 
considered important and useful notions in science.8  Based on this, 
Woodward makes a plausible case that the notion of invariance should be 
preferred to the notion of lawhood in science: first, given that a dichoto-
mous classification of generalizations is unsatisfactory, a strong conceptual 
argument in favour of notions that allow for degrees in the classification 
of generalizations arises, and second, the notion of invariance under inter-
ventions is better suited for actual scientific practice than the dichotomous 
notion of lawhood.
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4. Invariance and Historical Specificity9
This section will connect the notion of historical specificity with the notion 
of invariance. Following up on the discussion in the previous section, in 
this section I argue that while the notion of lawhood does not leave room 
for historical specificity, the notion of invariance naturally incorporates 
this idea. If the notion of invariance should indeed replace the notion of 
lawhood in theories of causation and causal explanation, it follows that 
historical specificity—or at least relativity to a system or systems—is a 
natural feature of causal generalizations and explanations. Furthermore, 
I show that the idea of historical specificity is reconcilable with (at least 
some) methodological statements of both Milton Friedman and Fritz 
Machlup. 
4.1 Lawhood, Invariance, and Historical Specificity
If one adopts the traditional requirements for lawhood and requires laws 
to figure in explanations, or sees the discovery of universal laws as the 
aim of science, it readily follows that there is not much room, indeed 
no room at all, for the problem of historical specificity. Not only would 
a historically specific generalization clearly violate the requirement of 
exceptionlessness, it would also refer to particular systems or spatiotem-
poral locations, it would not necessarily have a wide scope (for it may be 
valid for only one specific type of socioeconomic system), and it would 
have clear limits on its unifying or systematizing potential (for this 
potential is limited to theorizing about the system(s) the generalization 
applies to). It is plausible, then, that to the extent that economists and 
philosophers of economics accepted the idea that discovering universal 
laws is the aim of economics, or the idea that successful explanations 
must refer to universal laws, this idea has withheld them from accepting 
the idea of historical specificity.
In contrast to the notion of universal laws, the notion of invariance 
naturally incorporates the problem of historical specificity. In Woodward’s 
words, his proposal “should also allow us to understand how a generaliza-
tion can play an explanatory role even though it holds only within a certain 
domain or over a limited spatiotemporal interval and has exceptions out-
side of these” (Woodward, 2005, p. 240). It is convenient to illustrate this 
using an example. Suppose that the generalization ‘The state of the infra-
structure influences the rate of economic growth’ (G-3) holds for capitalist 
societies, but not for communist societies. In that case, this generalization is 
invariant under interventions on the state of the infrastructure with respect 
to the rate of economic growth in a capitalist society; however, the same gen-
eralization is not (or hardly) invariant (…) in a communist society. Hence, 
generalization (G-3) can play an explanatory role in the context of a capi-
talist society, even though it has exceptions outside of the capitalist context 
(for instance in a communist society). The fact that (G-3) can have differ-
ent degrees of invariance depending on the system it is applied to reflects 
the system-relative aspect of the notion of invariance under interventions. 
It is this aspect of the notion of invariance that plays a key role in enabling 
it to deal properly with historically specific generalizations. The notion of 
invariance thus provides a sound underlying conceptual-causal framework 
that may help clarify discussions about the problem of historical speci-
ficity. It may also help to show, by the fact that historical specificity fits 
naturally in this framework, that using historically specific generalizations 
in explanations is not less scientific—indeed, may be more scientific—
than restricting oneself to only using ahistorical generalizations.
4.2 Reconciling Historical Specificity with the Methodologies of 
Friedman and Machlup
Even though the problem of historical specificity is nowadays largely 
forgotten about and even considered obsolete (or so Hodgson (2001) 
argues), the idea of historically sensitive theories is consistent with some 
methodological statements of two prominent economists—Milton Fried-
man and Fritz Machlup. This may be quite surprising, because Hodgson 
(2001, 232-247) argues that Friedman’s statement of the quantity theory 
of money (1956) promised fundamental and transhistorical regularities 
in economics. In the same chapter, it is argued that both Machlup (1946, 
1978) and Friedman (1953) contributed to making the theory of con-
sumers’ demand ahistorical by removing the assumption of conscious or 
deliberate choices.
Despite the fact that those economists in their actual scientific practice 
thus seem to have contributed mostly to the case against incorporating 
historical specificity in economics, reconciling their methodological state-
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ments with the notion of invariance and the idea of historical specificity 
is relatively straightforward. For example, in his well-known 1953 essay 
on the methodology of positive economics, Friedman writes that “The 
important problem in connection with the hypothesis is to specify the cir-
cumstances under which the formula works or, more precisely, the general 
magnitude of the error in its predictions under various circumstances” (p. 
18), and claims that this specification should be part and parcel of any 
hypothesis. One should be wary, though, of reading too much in this state-
ment. It seems that Friedman did not intend this statement as specifically, 
or even inter alia, supporting historical specificity in economics, for some 
pages later he writes that besides a conceptual world or abstract model, a 
hypothesis also consists of “a set of rules defining the class of phenomena 
for which the ‘model’ can be taken to be an adequate representation of the 
‘real world’” (p. 24). Hence, Friedman focusses more on classes of phe-
nomena than on different types of socioeconomic systems. Nevertheless, 
the idea that a hypothesis may only work under certain circumstances or 
may have different general error magnitudes in its predictions under differ-
ent circumstances in the ‘worst’ interpretative case does not contradict the 
idea of historical specificity. Indeed, even in this ‘worst’ interpretative case 
there is still room for connecting Friedman’s methodological statements 
with the notions of invariance and historical specificity.
Machlup expresses a similar view when he writes “A theory may be 
regarded as a model plus a specification of the empirical observations to 
which it applies” (1960, p. 572). In a later paper, Machlup puts it more 
elaborately: “To put this statement in a slightly different form, any model 
designed to present (exhibit) a causal connection between an independent 
variable and a dependent variable under given conditions—conditions 
which may include fundamental hypotheses and a set of less fundamental 
assumptions on various levels of generality or specificity—must display 
the dependent variable as a logical consequence of all the premisses in the 
model. Since these premisses imply the conclusion, there can be no doubt 
about the complete determinateness of the result. Of course, whether 
this whole apparatus with its input and its determinate output applies to 
many situations of the real world, or to only a few, or to none at all, is 
a different matter” (1974, p. 280). Thus, Machlup recognizes both that 
there are several levels of generality or specificity and that theories may 
or may not apply to different situations in the real world. Again, though, 
one should be careful in interpreting this statement, as it seems unlikely 
that Machlup’s intention was to support a notion of historical specificity. 
Nevertheless, Machlup’s position expressed here is clearly reconcilable 
with the idea of historical specificity.
The fact that the methodological positions of two prominent econo-
mists can be reconciled with the idea of historical specificity is of course not 
an argument in favour of incorporating historical specificity in economics. 
However, it may render the idea of historical specificity less controver-
sial than currently seems to be the case for economists. Moreover, given 
that Friedman’s 1953 essay remains influential in economics to this day, it 
could perhaps be used to demonstrate that the idea of historical specific-
ity is not so far removed from a widely accepted—that is, widely accepted 
among economists—methodological statement in economics. Whether it 
is a desirable and fruitful strategy to use Friedman’s controversial and con-
tested methodological essay to convince economists of the relevance of the 
problem of historical specificity is another matter, important in its own 
right but outside the scope of this essay.
5. Conclusion
The goal of this essay was twofold. First, the foremost goal was to argue in 
favour of developing historically sensitive theories in economics by appealing 
to Woodward’s (2005) notion of invariance. Based on Woodward’s argu-
ment that the dichotomous classification of generalizations as either ‘purely 
accidental’ or ‘universal law’ is unsatisfactory, further supported by actual 
scientific practice that seems to usually employ some notion of invariance, I 
followed Woodward in claiming that the notion of invariance should replace 
the notion of lawhood. Subsequently, I showed that adopting the notion of 
invariance provides one with a conceptual-causal framework that naturally 
incorporates (or at least can deal properly with) historically sensitive gener-
alizations. Putting this together, it follows that historical specificity—or at 
least relativity to a system or systems—is a natural feature of any causal gen-
eralization. If causal generalizations are historically sensitive, the implication 
is that (economic) theories should be historically sensitive as well.
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The second goal of this essay was to show that, even though the prob-
lem of historical specificity is nowadays largely forgotten, reconciling the 
idea of historically sensitive theories with some methodological statements 
of Milton Friedman and Fritz Machlup is relatively straightforward. The 
reason for this is that both Friedman and Machlup claim that a hypothesis 
does not necessarily always apply; a specification of when a hypothesis 
applies should be part of the hypothesis itself. Though this is clearly not 
an argument in favour of historically sensitive theories, the possibility of 
this reconciliation may be used as a strategy to convince economists that 
the problem of historical specificity is or should not be that controversial.
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Notes
1. Scarcity of resources here should be understood in the economists’ sense. That is, it refers 
to the idea that our resources are limited, whereas our aspirations (for which we need those 
resources) are unlimited.
2.  This section draws on Hodgson (2001), chapters 3-7 and 9. I can only provide a rough 
discussion here, for a detailed treatment the reader is referred to those chapters.
3.  The methodenstreit refers to a methodological dispute between the Austrian school and 
the German Historical school concerning inter alia historical specificity and the problem 
of induction versus deduction.
4.  This section draws on Woodward (2005) chapters 1, 2, 3, and 6.
5.  A formal definition of the notion of an intervention can be found in Woodward, 2005, 
p. 98.
6.  Taken from Woodward (2005), section 6.2.
7.   For a discussion on those other notions of invariance besides invariance under interven-
tions, see Woodward (2005), section 6.2.
8.  For example, the notions of resiliency (Skyrms, 1980), robustness (Redhead, 1987), and 
stability (Mitchell, 1997, 2000) all relate to the stability of generalizations or relationships 
under various changes. Somewhat longer ago, in 1944, Haavelmo introduced his notion 
of autonomous relationships which also incorporates degrees in the classification of a rela-
tionship as autonomous or not (where the notion of autonomy is some kind of invariance 
condition).
9.  Regarding Woodward’s position, this section draws again on Woodward (2005), chapter 6.
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